2

MOTIVES

FOR PURSUING A

SPANISH WAR

WITH

VIGOUR.

By a Member of Parliament.

LONDON:
Printed for E. CABE, in *Ave-Maria-Lane*.

MOTIVES

FOR PURSUING A

SPANISH WAR

WITH

VIGOUR.

By a Member of Parliament.

LONDON:

MOTIVES

FOR PURSUING A

SPANISH WAR.

EXPERIENCE has convinced us that few corruptions, either of a public or private nature, can withſtand the power of a free enquiry *; on this account, Engliſhmen juſtly ſet ſo great a value on that important privilege, the freedom of ſpeaking, and writing their ſentiments, upon points of the higheſt concernment. To this, we owe

* Thus it is, that our great Commoner ſhines in greater luſtre by a cloſe examination.

the defeat of popery and arbitrary power, the diſgrace of ſuperſtition, enthuſiaſm, and perſecution, and the overthrow of thoſe ſlaviſh doctrines of paſſive obedience and non-reſiſtance. Of its irreſiſtable efficacy, we have an ever memorable inſtance, in the deſtruction of a former adminiſtration. Though the friends of the Hanoverian ſucceſſion were then treated with the greateſt tyranny and oppreſſion, their writings burned by a common hangman, a member expelled the Houſe of Commons, and others underwent the moſt grievous impriſonments, expenſive proſecutions, and exorbitant fines, yet reaſon and argument were at length triumphant. If when the preſs was near being ſo reſtrained, that the miniſtry might, in effect, have the ſole uſe of it, and ſcarce any thing ſaw the light, *ſans privilege du miniſter*; if under this reſtraint of the great palladium of our liberties, public virtue and patriotiſm prevailed, what have we to fear, while we enjoy

joy this invaluable bleſſing, in its moſt deſirable extent? Certain it is that no government ever exerciſed ſo much lenity and forbearance towards its oppoſers, as the preſent have done towards theirs.

So peculiarly nice and delicate, is the ſituation of a miniſter of ſtate in Great Britain, that it is next to an impoſſibility he ſhould ſupport himſelf long againſt a powerful oppoſition. A gentleman conſidered in this ſituation, obliged to be obedient to his Prince, ſeldom ſure of his friends, and always expoſed to his enemies, muſt, in his conduct, be as unexceptionable, as his wiſdom is profound, in order to baffle the attempts of his enemies to deſtroy him. We ſay, that nothing but truth and virtue can turn the edge of ſatire and ridicule; and equally certain it is, that nothing but an honeſt and fearleſs conduct, could ſo long have maintained its ground, againſt that hur-

ricane of opppoſition, which the laſt great miniſter met with.

But now the fulneſs of time is come, when we may judge, with the greateſt certainty and aſſurance, who have laboured to uphold the honour and happineſs of this kingdom, and who to deſtroy both; who have had the true intereſt of trade and navigation at heart, and who have ſtruggled in earneſt to ruin them. In a word, who are the true, and who are the falſe friends of Great Britain.

Some have determined this point in favour of the writers againſt Mr. P—, but for no other reaſon, than upon account of the temporary fits of popularity, which they have now and then received. Theſe have kept up the ſpirits of the enemies of our great patriot; but, like thoſe habituated to ſtrong cordials, they have flagged the more afterwards.

It is to be hoped the pulſe of this nation will ever beat high for liberty; not ſo high however as to border upon lunacy. The people were heated when firſt theſe projects were debated, but now they are cool again; thoſe notable reflections and ſatirical hints *, which were found ſo pungent are no more; people are convinced that a thouſand fine arguments and fabricks in the mind, concerning the theory of policy, give an empty ſatisfaction, but no benefit, and rather ſerve to ſwell than fill the ſoul.

Theſe flights of political enthuſiaſm are eaſily accounted for: why the enemies of Mr. P—— have made ſo much noiſe in the world, and his friends ſo little, is becauſe one have had the labouring oar, the defenſive and argumentive part, which few

* *Vide* Several of the letters in one of the Daily Papers.

few underſtand, and fewer attend to; and the other, the declamatory, ſatirical, and defamatory part, which all have a taſte for. The entertaining part has been carried by a compact and united body, who have purſued the ſame end by the ſame means; the other by a disjointed, ſtraggling body, who, though they have had the ſame end in view, have proſecuted it by different and leſs conſiderable means. This hath given great ſcope to wit and drollery, in playing off againſt one another, about trivial and immaterial points, and gaining on each ſide devotees and admirers. In ſhort, Mr. P—— and his friends, have laboured more to *do* right than make it appear.

There is now the ſtrongeſt proof of the ſagacity and penetration of Mr. P——: he urged at the time of his reſignation, a declaration of war againſt Spain, for what ſhe had *then done*; and common ſenſe, with a very ſmall knowledge of things, will, in

a

a moment, inform a man how much more advantageous a declaration of war againſt Spain would have been at that time, when ſhe muſt have been leſs prepared for it, than now, when ſhe has had further time to conſider and make ready. The wiſdom and neceſſity of his propoſal now appears, in ſpite of invidious arts to ſlander and miſrepreſent it; even thoſe who oppoſed and derided, are at length obliged to adopt his meaſures; and we have the great misfortune to lament, that his advice was not followed at firſt. No juſter compariſon can be made of his conduct, than by that of queen Elizabeth, juſt before the Spaniſh Armada ſailed, at a time when the affairs of the nation were conducted by ſound policy.

In the year 1580, ſeven hundred Spaniards and Italians, under the name of the pope's troops, made a deſcent on Ireland, where they propoſed to fortify themſelves, but were all put to the ſword. Not long

long after this, Bernardin de Mendoza, the Spaniſh ambaſſador here, complained that Drake, who was juſt come from his voyage round the world, had robbed the king, his maſter, in the Indies; upon which the queen ordered part of Drake's booty to be reſtored.

Notwithſtanding the reaſons which both ſovereigns had to complain of each other, they outwardly carried on a fair correſpondence; and their commerce, which the ſubjects of neither could do without, was the reaſon that the differences between them were not yet arrived to an open rupture. Beſides, Philip found his account more in ſupporting Elizabeth's enemies underhand, than in attacking her himſelf with open force; he therefore kept an ambaſſador at London, to lay hold of every opportunity to do the queen a prejudice. At length the ſecretary Walſingham, detected him in favouring the deſign of Mary queen of Scots,

Scots, and he was thereupon ordered to quit the kingdom.

Philip, the Spaniſh monarch, immediately made prodigious preparations, in all the ports of Spain, for a great and vigorous attack on England. He covered his preparations with various pretences, for fear it ſhould be known that they were intended againſt England; but Elizabeth, than whom no monarch had ever better ſpies, or rather more able miniſters, to procure and employ them, had undoubted information that her's was the only ſtate againſt which his preparations were intended. She reſolved therefore not to loſe a moment in putting herſelf in a condition to oppoſe the enemy; and Sir Francis Drake, with a large fleet, was ſent to Cadiz, where he deſtroyed a hundred ſail of ſhips, and a great quantity of ſtores and ammunition; afterwards he ſailed towards the Tercera

iſlands, and intercepted the proviſions intended for the Armada.

Theſe were violent meaſures, but they were ſuch as were dictated by ſound policy and prudence; they were founded on thoſe ſpirited and patriotic principles, on which our great commoner intended to have acted, when he reſigned: he, like Elizabeth, found the Spaniards were determined to be no longer friends, and therefore urged an *immediate* commiſſion for hoſtilities, before they were prepared to repel the attack, as more wiſe than putting off the unavoidable meaſure, till the people became clamorous for it; he perceived the underhand aſſiſtance which the Spaniards had given, and were giving to the French; and he foreſaw that a war with Spain *muſt* be entered into; therefore now it muſt be acknowledged, that it would have been better to have ſubmitted to his direction, when he firſt propoſed the meaſure, than to have put it off; by which

which ſome opportunities are undoubtedly loſt.

He had long ſeen with infinite regret, a powerful oppoſition to his beſt laid ſchemes, by which his vigorous deſigns have been conſigned to oblivion, and the Britiſh navy for ſome time in an injurious and ſhameful ſtate of inactivity. It is no difficult matter to conceive with what indignation his breaſt muſt beat, when he ſuffered diſappointment after diſappointment, and check after check, in order to force him to a reſignation, or make him appear odious to the people; what muſt he feel after having ſerved his country with unwearied pains, fidelity, and ſucceſs, at ſuch ungrateful uſage? It was the remembrance of a conſtant oppoſition to his meaſures, that ſtimulated him to urge in ſo vehement a manner, the neceſſity of an immediate war with Spain: he ſaid the Spaniards would certainly declare againſt us, and to anticipate their

declaration, by one on the part of ourſelves, was the meaſure he ſtrenuouſly inſiſted upon; what now will his enemies ſay, that the meaſure has at length proved itſelf to be a good one, and they have embraced it, as the beſt they could take. Spain was become our enemy, by ſecretly aſſiſting the power with whom we were at war; and ſhe might, before ſhe thought herſelf ready to declare againſt Great-Britain, form an alliance with ſeveral other powers, and her enmity become of more conſequence than if ſhe was attacked before her political ſyſtem was eſtabliſhed, or her projects ready for execution.

The wiſdom of this propoſal is now ſeen, and its neceſſity at that time is now obvious to every one; therefore we may reſt ourſelves fully convinced that what he was going to do, was for the good of the nation, whatever a few ſnarling proſtitutes may ſay to the contrary; and it is further juſtified by his ſucceſſors, and even his oppoſers

oppoſers adopting the deſign, though not till the following year. The uprightneſs of his conduct now ſhews itſelf, and every day adds, if poſſible, more luſtre, to his ever diſtinguiſhable character. There now appears to the weakeſt underſtanding, the warmth and integrity of an antient Briton, in what he ſaid. When it was aſſerted, in oppoſition to his propoſal, that " Spain would think twice, " before ſhe declared war againſt this " kingdom:" His ſpirited anſwer was, " I will not give them time to think, " This is the time; let us cruſh the " whole houſe of Bourbon. But if the " members of this —— are of another " opinion, this is the laſt time I ſhall ever " mix in its counſels."

He reſigned! But it muſt be allowed, and it is beyond the powers of art and deceit to bring proof to the contrary, that he had the beſt intelligence, and the keeneſt penetration of what Spain was about

about; and furniſhed with this information, he would have behaved like Queen Elizabeth, had he been permitted; he would have begun the buſineſs without any more ceremony, than was conſiſtent with the honour of an injured people, and the ſecret intentions of a pretended neutral power. He was ſenſible that there were only two choices, either giving the nation, and all Europe, to know, that we were groſly inſulted and abuſed by the court of Madrid, without having the ſpirit to reſent it, or immediately declare war; his pride, and a noble praiſe-worthy one it is, made him contemn the former, and urge the latter.

What the particular reaſons are, that could induce Spain to act in this manner, may be a problem not very hard to be reſolved. She is at preſent in a flouriſhing ſtate, and ſhe behaves as inſolently, as if the treaſures of the Indies were at her diſpoſal, and her invincible armadas were

again

again under ſail. This muſt proceed from one of two cauſes, or perhaps from both. The firſt is, a thorough contempt for our court, grounded on the obſervation of the weakneſs and the inconſiſtency of our councils, and the impunity which has all along attended the groſſeſt inſults, and the deepeſt wounds they have given to the honour of the nation. Or it muſt be owing to the hopes of being ſupported by other powers.

The only way to give her an effectual retort is, by a change of our preſent meaſures, that we may be left at liberty to revenge the national injuſtice, and purſue only the Britiſh intereſt. We have too long been made the bubbles of Europe, and employed our forces in Germany, and our fleets ſubſervient to the Germanic ſyſtem, to our own injury; beſides the money that is here laviſhed away in making *prudent* alliances on the continent. Therefore let us not continually

ſuffer

ſuffer by German wars; let us not always envy the glory of becoming the *heroic dupes* and Quixote-champions for the liberties of mankind; but renounce theſe ties ſo fatal to our intereſts.

Experience has now taught us wit, and providence hath given us honeſty; ſo that we have the moſt juſt reaſon, with a patriot King, for the future, to expect that the Britiſh arms will be employed only in the cauſe of Britain: that we ſhall fight only our *own* quarrels; and defend only our *own* rights.

There never was a more hearty and general unanimity between the united ſtates of the legiſlature, and the united voice of the whole people, than what has diſcovered itſelf on the preſent occaſion. To this let us add, the ſteadineſs and fidelity of the miniſtry, who are ſo far from being ſuſpected of holding any criminal correſpondence with our enemies, that, on the

the contrary, too much zeal has been objected againſt them, by ſome modern malignants, who have maliciouſly inſinuated, that they have brought a dangerous war upon us by unneceſſary precautions, and providing in too hoſtile a manner againſt the attempts and deſigns of our enemies.

The cauſe of Britain ought to be ſteadily and earneſtly purſued; and no meaſure ever denoted the more wiſe intentions of the government, in ſo doing, than in making a Spaniſh war at this juncture; if they mean to withhold the immenſe treaſure annually exported to Germany, in ſupport of wars with which we have not the leaſt connexion, and from which we can derive no advantage, it ſurely now is plain, notwithſtanding all that "a parcel of ſyco-" phants, and time ſervers, at the time that " our alliance was made with the king of " Pruſſia, undertake to aſſert that he was ſo

" great and able an aſſiſtant to us, we could
" not, nay, we ſhould be runied without
" him : it was diſloyalty, they affirm-
" ed, not to believe theſe tales, and yet
" they were palpable falſhoods ; they were
" jacobites and rebels who did not own
" that the king of Pruſſia was fighting for
" the cauſe of Great Britain. Theſe proſti-
" tutes of the public weal, made a maſk for
" the true welfare of this nation : they
" held out a falſe viſage to the people, who
" were taught to idolize this ſhadow of
" honour, this monument of deception ;
" while impoſtors in great numbers took the
" field, on paper, in ſhouting to the drunken
" mob the praiſe of the Pruſſian
" demigod †. This noiſy nonſenſe about
" German

† What now will old mother Probus ſay ; will ſhe continue to *impoſe* on the good people of England, her idle, unmeaning ſtuff, about the defence of Germany ; or will ſhe *ſet hard to work* in writing *dull* eſſays in behalf

" German politics turned the heads of the
" people; they forgot their own national
" diſpute; they forgot that but a little while
" before the king of Pruſſia was the object
" of their utmoſt hatred, when they freely
" ſpent their money in Germany, for fear
" he ſhould get Sileſia; and now they be-
" gan to pour forth their millions to pre-
" vent his loſing it. Nay, what is more in-
" credible, they ſuffered themſelves to be
" deluded by a phantom, that the pro-
" teſtant religion was in danger; and yet
" in the laſt war, when Great Britain had
" the Empreſs Queen in alliance, and the
" king of Pruſſia was aſſiſted by the king
" of France, they did not think the pro-
" teſtant religion at all concerned, and he
" was then univerſally decried by ourſelves
" and allies, as a man void of faith, reli-

 " gion,

---

half of a Spaniſh war; come, Probus, come thou ape of the Reviewers in the Ledger, come; launch forth thy lucubrations, that in our coffee houſes we may once more fall aſleep over thy ſtrong doſes.

" great and able an aſſiſtant to us, we could
" not, nay, we ſhould be runied without
" him : it was diſloyalty, they affirm-
" ed, not to believe theſe tales, and yet
" they were palpable falſhoods ; they were
" jacobites and rebels who did not own
" that the king of Pruſſia was fighting for
" the cauſe of Great Britain. Theſe proſti-
" tutes of the public weal, made a maſk for
" the true welfare of this nation : they
" held out a falſe viſage to the people, who
" were taught to idolize this ſhadow of
" honour, this monument of deception ;
" while impoſtors in great numbers took the
" field, on paper, in ſhouting to the drunken
" mob the praiſe of the Pruſſian
" demigod †. This noiſy nonſenſe about
" German

† What now will old mother Probus ſay ; will ſhe continue to *impoſe* on the good people of England, her idle, unmeaning ſtuff, about the defence of Germany ; or will ſhe *ſet hard to work* in writing *dull* eſſays in behalf

" German politics turned the heads of the
" people; they forgot their own national
" diſpute; they forgot that but a little while
" before the king of Pruſſia was the object
" of their utmoſt hatred, when they freely
" ſpent their money in Germany, for fear
" he ſhould get Sileſia; and now they be-
" gan to pour forth their millions to pre-
" vent his loſing it. Nay, what is more in-
" credible, they ſuffered themſelves to be
" deluded by a phantom, that the pro-
" teſtant religion was in danger; and yet
" in the laſt war, when Great Britain had
" the Empreſs Queen in alliance, and the
" king of Pruſſia was aſſiſted by the king
" of France, they did not think the pro-
" teſtant religion at all concerned, and he
" was then univerſally decried by ourſelves
" and allies, as a man void of faith, reli-

 " gion,

---

half of a Spaniſh war; come, Probus, come thou ape of the Reviewers in the Ledger, come; launch forth thy lucubrations, that in our coffee houſes we may once more fall aſleep over thy ſtrong doſes.

" gion, and principle. When he entered " upon this war, he began to cruſh the " very ſtate that gave birth to proteſtant- " iſm ; and in a little time, there were " more proteſtants fighting againſt him " than for him ; and even theſe latter few " were taken into our own immediate pay " to prevent their joining the oppoſite " cauſe. Where then is the danger to " which the proteſtant religion is expoſed, " but from the proteſtants themſelves, cut- " ting one another's throats". And where is the advantage that we have in theſe quarrels ? there is none in German gratitude ; and where is there any immediate benefit to this nation in upholding German princes ?

Let us vigorouſly purſue a Spaniſh war; it is for the national honour and advantage; and the only way to do it is to quit Germany. We have nothing to fear from a Spaniſh war, if we are but left at liberty to purſue only the Britiſh intereſt. Were the

French

French marine in its full vigour, ſuch as it was at the beginning of the laſt war and of this, and ſuch as it will be againſt the next war, if we now neglect the proper means to ſecure ourſelves, the addition of the Spaniſh marine to it, would, in that caſe, be a juſt ground of concern: but can thoſe men really fear a Spaniſh war, in which, now that the marine of Spain muſt be unſupported by that of France, we can have nothing to fear, and muſt have every thing to hope for; and yet wantonly run the nation into an expence, of ten millions, for a German quarrel, in which we have not the leaſt concern, and from which not the leaſt good can reſult to Britain? can men be really afraid of meeting a weaker power than ourſelves at ſea, and yet go to Germany to ſeek a power at land which is in itſelf ſtronger than we?

And as to a diverſion by this German war, it is a falſe notion; we have for four years been ſpending twenty millions to prevent

prevent the French from ſuccouring their colonies, when half the troops and treaſure employed in this diverſion, would, two or three years ago, have given ſuch an irreſiſtible ſuperiority to our fleets and expeditions, as would have left our enemies no colonies to ſuccour.

But many ſay we are got into the German war, and how can we get out? The anſwer is eaſy. By not getting farther into it. There is no need of violating any treaty; let us faithfully adhere to all our engagements, but let us not make freſh ones; and that alone will finiſh the German war. Laſt year it was ſaid, that the beſt thing in the Pruſſian treaty, was, its being made but for a year. Why then ſhould we renew it again? Whatever may be ſaid, this nation cannot be bound to give the King of Pruſſia four millions of crowns, as long as he ſhall be pleaſed to make war. If we intend to carry on our Spaniſh war with vigour,

vigour, there is a neceſſity for quitting Germany; which is obvious to every man.

It is obſerved, that the preſent is, perhaps, the moſt proper juncture for declaring war againſt Spain, of any that has offered for many years. In Old Spain, the government is on the point of being miſerably diſtreſſed. A barren year among them has occaſioned a vaſt ſcarcity of proviſions, and has ruined multitudes of the common people. Such is the ſituation of Old Spain. But that of New Spain, and their dominions in America, is ſtill worſe.

After their conqueſt of theſe countries, every ſubject of Spain was equally qualified to be a governor. This was of great ſervice to the ſubjects; for the governors were generally men who had great natural intereſt in the country, and took care that their government ſhould be as mild as poſſible; ſo that in a ſhort time the

the people arrived at a ſurpriſing pitch of wealth and power. But this plan not being agreeable to the genius of the Spaniſh court, which, perhaps, grew jealous of the flouriſhing condition of their foreign dominions, they diſqualified all from being governors, who were not Caſtillians. Theſe being generally very poor, when they were ſent over to the governments, oppreſſed the people intolerably; and the whole of the Spaniſh government in America is no better than a faction. A door was lately opened for a number of hungry Italians, to get all the poſts of profit and truſt there, and has thereby weakened the government ſo much, that no change could happen at preſent, which would not be agreeable to their ſubjects. Therefore, if we ſhould at preſent act with vigour, and in good earneſt, there is all the reaſon in the world to believe, that we might diſtreſs the Spaniſh court, ſo as to make them agree to any terms we ſhall pleaſe to impoſe.

The

The Spaniards, by their laſt treatment of us, had compleated the meaſure of their iniquity; and it was high time to give a looſe to the national vengeance due to the wrongs ſuffered by a people impatient of injuries, and jealous of their rights.

Can we conceive a more abject ſervility of conduct, than for a people, ſo long famed for commerce and bravery, to ſee their darling good, and their peculiar glory, the pledge of their liberty, and life of all their property, juſt going to be forcibly and unrighteouſly torn from them, and tamely look on without one ſtruggle for ſo great a bleſſing, or one hearty effort againſt the invaders of it? What ſhould we become, if we gave our conſent to ſuch ruin, and ſuffer ourſelves to be ſtripped of our boaſted ſtrength and ornament at once, but a nation, the moſt deſpicable of all nations under heaven, expoſed to the contempts and inſults of

all the world below, and rendered utterly unworthy, by our conduct, of the care of Providence above us.

Upon reading the memorial lately preſented by the count De Fuentes, (juſt before that ambaſſador departed this kingdom) I was extremely ſurprized to find ſuch language uſed in it; which would have appeared indecent between gentlemen, and is much more ſo between crowned heads. This ſeems the more extraordinary from his Catholic Majeſty, becauſe the utmoſt reſpect has been paid to his character; and whatever the zeal of ſome private gentlemen might urge them to ſay, yet no *hard-names*, or *inflaming language*, has been publickly made uſe of in the height of all our juſt indignation againſt him: but my ſurprize ceaſed, when I was informed that this memorial was penned by an eccleſiaſtic belonging to the Spaniſh chapel, in conjunction with a French jeſuit; perhaps,

the

the ſame who enticed our ſhip-builders away. Theſe two perſons are, as I am told, now employed at the Hague in drawing up another memorial.

But as the only hope of our enemy ſeemed to conſiſt in the general diſinclination of the people to new wars, debts, and taxes; and the chief deſign of this inſolent memorial, was to exaſperate and inflame the kingdom againſt the late great miniſter, by repreſenting him as the ſole author of the future diſturbances of Europe: ſo we have the ſatisfaction to ſee them grievouſly miſtaken and diſappointed in their expectation; for the people were never more unanimous than at preſent; they declare, in every extraordinary manner, their affection for his Majeſty, and their reſolution to ſupport him vigorouſly againſt all his enemies.

During the whole courſe of the preſent war, the Spaniards have been ſe-

cretly aſſiſting the French: the wax was ſcarce cold on his late Majeſty's declaration of war, when we found ourſelves inſidiouſly oppoſed by the Spaniards, who, under the pretenſions of neutrality, took every opportunity to aſſiſt the enemy.

When the preſent king of Spain aſcended that throne, it was hoped that Mr. Wall would have had more influence in the Spaniſh council, than Don Sebaſtian de Eſlava; and that the court of Madrid would have abated in its attachment to France by obſerving a ſtrict neutrality, or, at leaſt, conſulting their own intereſt; which every mercantile Spaniard knows is to be in friendſhip with England. However, we find no alteration in the Spaniſh ſyſtem; and therefore Great-Britain has declared war, becauſe Spain has united herſelf to France.

Neither of theſe nations can ever love us, therefore let us never treat with ceremony:

mony: and indeed there are good reaſons to be given why they cannot love us; their governments being tyrannical and deſpotic, they abhor our conſtitution, which admits of liberty and the avowal of right to juſt reſiſtance.

But their moſt univerſal cauſe of diſlike is that of religion: they are all blind and bigotted papiſts; conſtrained to believe, under the penalties of corporal puniſhments, as well as eternal damnation, that our religion is abhorred by the Almighty, and pernicious to the world; and that we are, by a power which is delegated from heaven, given up to the dominion of Satan, and muſt be puniſhed with him eternally.

With ſuch opinions, which they are compelled to hold, it is impoſſible for them to love us, or even to wiſh us well.

To hope then that we ſhall have any reſpect or juſtice from them but what is founded in fear, would be abuſing our reaſon; that ſhould convince us to the contrary; now we have intereſts and projects to puſh in their dominions, they can only be done by creating ourſelves reſpect.

Let us, as ſoon as poſſible, attack the Spaniſh fort and town of St. Auguſtine in Florida: the maſtering of this place, will give us the undiſputed conqueſt of the whole province; for interiorally the country is very thinly peopled, and therefore not capable to make any reſiſtance: at the ſame time another detachment of our force ſhould be directed againſt the town of Orleans, and the other French ſettlements at the mouth of the Miſſiſippi, in Louiſiana, the conquering of which cannot be deemed a difficult matter, becauſe they are not very ſtrong: by

theſe

theſe acquiſitions our empire in North America will become complete, and free from the dangers of all encroachments; the advantage of which I will forbear to expatiate on, becauſe every man may conceive them.

Within theſe few days orders have been iſſued for an additional levy to our land forces, and a hot preſs for ſeamen is going forward: theſe are proofs, that there is a ſpirit in the nation for humbling the Spaniards. But ſhould we be miſtaken, ſhould we find that the armaments, and the oppreſſions on our trade, are deſigned only to amuſe,—how fatally may we then experience what has been ſo often foretold, and is now ſo little believed?

We may now, perhaps, feel the loſs of Minorca; but let us not as ſhamefully forget Gibraltar: the loſs of the former ought to double our eſtimation of the latter; and we ought to be as *early*

poſſible

poſſible, in ſending very *good* and *ſufficient* force for its ſecurity.—As not unapplicable to the preſent time, I have ſubjoined a few thoughts on its importance.

The port of Gibraltar never more juſtly deſerved our attention than at this time, if conſidered only in two points: firſt, as it preſerves to us the conveniency, protection, and ſecurity of our trade to the Streights, above that of all other nations; more eſpecially in regard to the Algerines and Saleemen, who are influenced by it to continue their treaties made with us, which they never do longer with any other nation than till they find it their intereſt to break them: ſecondly, in reſpect to the great advantage which the poſſeſſion of that place hath already given us, when in war with France and Spain; and conſequently will always give us again on the like occaſions.

Firſt

Firſt, in reſpect to our trade; for as it commands the paſſage or entrance of all our navigation into the Mediterranean both in peace and war; ſo it is equally neceſſary, and as much our intereſt to preſerve it, as it is for any gentleman to keep poſſeſſion of the gate which leads to his own houſe, it being in the power of thoſe who poſſeſs this port, at all times to interrupt, annoy, or hinder whom they ſhall think fit in their trade, by keeping only two or three ſhips of war on that ſtation, in the ſame manner almoſt as the Danes, by the poſſeſſion of Elſineur, command the paſſage into and out of the Baltick; the ſecurity of our Italian, Turky and fiſh trades entirely depends on our keeping this place.

Secondly, in reſpect to our neighbours; Gibraltar is ſituated in ſuch manner, that it is in the power of the preſent poſſeſſors to cut off any naval communication from the Mediterranean ſea to the Atlantic, between France and Spain; with which we

have had ſuch frequent occaſions to be at war for almoſt theſe forty years paſt; and farther, by our poſſeſſion of this place, all nations, within the Mediterranean, are either obliged to court our friendſhip or feel our power.

But laying aſide all other conſiderations, there cannot be a ſtronger proof of the importance which the poſſeſſion of this place hath been to us, than that it hath in a manner occaſioned, the deſtruction of great part of the naval power of France: they never could ſend any naval ſtores to America, without an apparent danger of falling into our hands in going through the Streights. It muſt not be forgot that its proximity to Cadiz, the great mart and centre of almoſt all the riches of America, gives us the greateſt opportunity of commanding that port, and the trade frequenting it from the Weſt Indies; which, in time of a war with Spain, may be reckon'd of no ſmall conſideration and importance.

Whether

Whether therefore we look on Gibraltar either in a mercantile or a political light, firſt, as it not only ſecures our own commerce to Italy, Africa, and the Levant, from the inſults and annoyance of the Algerines; or, ſecondly, as it cuts off all communication between the ports of our enemies, and thereby render their naval force inconſiderable; that the abſolute preſervation of it ought now to be conſidered as the firſt point of our moſt ſerious attention.

But once more, and to conclude: As the advantages of Gibraltar which reſult to this kingdom, from the foregoing particulars, are fully confirmed and demonſtrated by the experience of many years; ſo the preſervation of it at this time is of much greater importance than ever it was before, as will appear to any man who has but a very ſmall knowledge of the preſent ſtate of affairs.

F I N I S.